REPRISAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT?
Revenge is a kind of wild justice; which the more mans nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. For as for the first wrong, it doth offend the law; but the revenge of that wrong putteth the law out of office. The policy of the United States is to abide by the laws of armed conflict and maintain the moral high ground, even in cases where some might argue the conventions of international law do not apply. Maintaining that standard of observing legal norms allows the United States to demand observance of the law by others. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, calls for compliance by the enemy with the laws of war have not achieved such respect for these standards. The enemy, in fact, fights wars based on a variety of practices in direct violation of the laws of war, including failing to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, using weapons and tactics that cause unnecessary harm, and torture, mutilation and desecration of casualties. In spite of these challenges soldiers face in tactics used against them, the United States has conducted several courts-martial designed to hold American servicemembers accountable for their actions during war, applying the laws of armed conflict and demanding adherence.
It is time, however, to ensure American servicemembers get the full protections of the law of war in waging their own fight, and to hold them accountable in greater consideration of the full circumstances on the ground that these soldiers face every day.
In order to accomplish this goal and to allow soldiers whose actions are questioned to offer a context to their response, the United States should apply and enforce the doctrine of reprisals. If "violating the law of war, even in a manner it allows, is a repugnant act, yet an even more repugnant act is to allow an adversary to violate that same law with impunity."
1 American soldiers should have an opportunity to use the law of war to demand compliance, and changes in the law should ensure soldiers have an opportunity to present as part of their legal defense that their actions were in response to illegal acts of the enemy. In some cases, the prior illegal acts of the enemy may provide a legal excuse for American soldiers' actions.
Reprisals under International Law
Reprisal is an otherwise illegal act done in response to a prior illegal act by an enemy, proportionate to the original wrong and designed to compel the enemy to desist from his illegal acts on the battlefield. Under such circumstances, the law of armed conflict recognizes the otherwise illegal act as legal. International law has evolved in its application of the doctrine of reprisal to avoid an increasing spiral of violence as one side reprises against another's illegal acts generating increasingly violent bloodshed, when the laws of war are designed to regulate and limit such harm. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that international law should no longer recognize the doctrine of reprisal due to its lack of efficacy. But the doctrine lives, notwithstanding efforts to ban reprisals in international conventions, and soldiers should be allowed to avail themselves of the doctrine in defending their actions alleged to be illegal.
Naulilaa Case
The classic definition of reprisal comes from the Naulilaa case, involving claims between Portugal and Germany, in which the arbitration tribunal stated:
Reprisals are an act of self-help on the part of the injured states, responding after an unsatisfied demand to an act contrary to international law on the part of the offending State . . . . They would be illegal if a previous act contrary to international law had not furnished the reason for them. They aim to impose on the offending Sate reparation for the offense or the return to legality in avoidance of new offenses.
2
The aim of the reprisal, and the element that distinguishes it from an act purely of selfdefense or vengeance, is to compel another state or entity to abide by international law and the laws of war in the on-going battle, or jus in bello.
3
In addition, the Naulilaa case laid out requirements or limits on use of reprisal by a state, including: (1) that the reprisal may only be carried out by a state or its agent or instrumentality; (2) the act of reprisal must be proportionate to the illegal act it responds to; and, (3) there must first be an attempt to resolve or address the illegal act by other than resort to force. In Naulilaa, the arbitration panel found the state claiming authorized reprisal, Germany, had not met the requirements in that the response was not proportionate, having destroyed Portuguese forts and posts in six separate acts in response to the loss of three Germans; the earlier Portuguese misunderstanding did not violate international law; and there had been no attempt to resolve the matter peacefully before resorting to reprisal. 4 Notwithstanding that Germany's claim of reprisal was found to be without merit, the standards enunciated remain valid.
Elements of Reprisal
At first blush, the first element of reprisal under Naulilaa might appear to make The requirement for proportionality in reprisal may not be a purely 1:1 calculation, particularly as there is no requirement that the form of reprisal match the nature of the original illegal act, e.g., an illegal use of a weapon by the first actor does not limit reprisal only to another illegal use of that kind of weapon. But as the Naulilaa arbitration found the German claimed reprisal illegal based in part on lack of proportionality, states must articulate the basis for the measure of response. In assessing whether the response is proportionate, one considers that the basis for the reprisal is to force compliance with international law. This proviso may mean that less harm might compel the desired compliance, but the upper limit on proportionality in reprisal would appear to be the level of violence in the original act. The Commission of Experts convened by the United Nations noted that "the proportionality is not strict, for if the reprisal is to be effective, it will often be greater than the original wrongdoing. Nevertheless, there must be a reasonable relationship between the original wrong and the reprisal measure." 5 The third element of attempting to address the illegal act by means other than resort to force characterizes reprisal as a last resort, or the principle of subsidiarity. 6 Although means short of force are preferred, such alternatives are not required where expeditious response will save lives. Requiring resort to peaceful resolution, however, reinforces the efforts to avoid upward spirals in violence by entities claiming reprisals.
Additional elements of reprisal found in customary international law include notice, i.e., warning of the reprisal action, and that the reprisal is temporary in that it ceases once the adversary stops violating the law. The importance of this evolution in the law is to reflect the growing concern to protect classes of people and property from unlawful violence even during a conflict, but One might resolve the viability of the doctrine of reprisals depending on whether one adopts a traditional view of international law characterized by reciprocity between states. In that case, the wrong done by one state merits a wrong done unto it by the victim-state. The modern construct, however, calls for obligations not only to other states under international law, but also to the international community at large, and respect for human rights to all peoples that would dissuade recourse to reprisal notwithstanding the wrong done by an opposing entity. 12 The 1949 Geneva
Conventions reinforced the obligation of a state's respect toward non-combatants "in all circumstances" as opposed to determining its actions based simply on state to state reciprocity. 13 Current application of this adherence to international human rights law as a basis of prohibiting all forms of reprisal was enunciated by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): 14 The Trial Chamber wishes to stress, in this regard, the irrelevance of reciprocity, particularly in relation to obligations found within international humanitarian law which have an absolute and non-derogable character. It thus follows that the tu quoque defence has no place in contemporary international humanitarian law. The defining characteristic of modern international humanitarian law is instead the obligation to uphold key tenets of this body of law regardless of the conduct of enemy combatants. 15 The ICTY asserted that international prosecution for war crimes was the remedy for violations rather than reprisals; notwithstanding the pronouncements of the ICTY, however, the doctrine of reprisals is not dead.
United States Rules Regarding Reprisals
United States regulations permit reprisal by US forces as laid out in Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Law of Land Warfare. 16 It recognizes reprisal as a proper remedial action for violation of the law of war against the United States. 17 The Army rules prohibit reprisals against prisoners of war, the wounded and sick and protected civilians, but permit reprisals against enemy troops. 18 Of note, FM 27-10 adheres to the tenets of international law by expressly prohibiting reprisals as a form of revenge, and further requires that individual soldiers should not execute reprisals unless approved on order of a commander, but without further specifying the level of a subordinate commander who may approve a reprisal. 19 The argument against reprisals exists that, insofar as "any situation 'where a belligerent reprisal seems permissible presents the belligerent with an opportunity to violate a rule of the law of war with impunity.'" 20 As the doctrine of reprisal developed, an act of reprisal could only be taken by authority of the government of a state. 21 Illegal acts in World Wars I and II resulted in indiscriminate attacks that killed civilians, but the belligerent parties qualified their acts as reprisals, and therefore asserted they were not illegal. 22 Discussion in drafting Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions had as one view that actions in reprisal could only be taken at high levels of government, 23 reflecting a desire that by withholding authority to a higher level might avoid a series of counterreprisals that would result in ever increasing violence. Requiring high level approval also responded to the argument against reprisals that the likelihood an individual who committed a violation of the law of war would be tried by national courts is meager, and if tried, the offender would likely only receive a mild punishment. 24 In the United States military, on the other hand, courts-martial have held soldiers accountable for their actions on the battlefield.
An additional challenge with regard to belligerent reprisals is that most often the target of the reprisal is not a perpetrator of the initial illegal act that forms the basis for the reprisal. Rather, the victim is part of the group, or collective, and under a rubric of collective responsibility is made to suffer for the acts of others in that group. 25 The
Oxford Manual addressed the authority to inflict harm on other than the perpetrators as follows:
If the injured party deem the misdeed so serious in character as to make it necessary to recall the enemy to a respect for law, no other recourse than a resort to reprisals remains. Reprisals are an exception to the general rule of equity, that an innocent person ought not to suffer for the guilty.
They are also at variance with the rule that each belligerent should conform to the rules of war, without reciprocity on the part of the enemy. provides special rules for defenses, and specifically for those, such as reprisals, in which the accused does not deny having committed the objective act constituting the charged offense, but denies criminal responsibility. 34 In such cases the accused soldier assumes the burden of proof to establish his defense and to show that the death or injury caused was justified. 35 Additionally, the law recognizes a mistake of fact defense 36 if an accused soldier thought, for instance, that the enemy's original act was a violation of the law of war, and relied on that act as a basis for his reprisal.
Timing of the characterization of an act as reprisal is not in and of itself determinative that it is or is not a lawful reprisal. There must, however, be some correlation between the precipitating illegal act and the offending act defended as reprisal. The relevant connection may be evaluated by time or individuals; that is, has the soldier accused of wrongdoing suffered from illegal acts of the enemy, and was that a basis for his conduct. It is important at this point in analysis not simply to underwrite acts of vengeance, but to apply the legal doctrine and note that reprisal by a soldier at a given time must intend to reform the conduct of his adversary, and not simply wreak vengeance, for "an unlawful act committed under the guise of retaliation or vengeance remains unlawful, and the claim of retaliation or vengeance is no defense." The best means to analyze reprisal as a defense to criminal charges is to consider the legal instructions a fact-finder would consider and apply to the facts as proven. Depart of the Army Pamphlet 27-9 38 contains legal instructions, and this paper
proposes adding the following instruction for courts-martial in which an accused soldier asserts a defense of reprisal:
The accused in this case relies on the doctrine of reprisal to justify his actions. If you find that the prosecution has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the charged offense, then the accused is not guilty and you need not make any findings as to reprisal. If, on the other hand, you find the prosecution has proven the accused committed the charged illegal act, then you must consider whether the doctrine of reprisal excuses the wrongful nature of the accused's act. In order to be valid, an act done in reprisal must meet the following conditions: (1) there was a prior law of war violation committed by an enemy combatant, (2) that the accused, if he acted on his own authority, made an effort to redress the illegal act before resort to force, (3) that the act done by the accused was proportionate to the enemy's illegal act, and (4) that the act of the accused was done with the intent to make the enemy conform his conduct to the laws of armed conflict and not merely as an act of vengeance, the latter of which is not protected by reprisal and does not constitute a legal excuse for criminal conduct.
This proposed instruction on the law of reprisal sets the framework for a court- In the current context, rather than applying conventional doctrine to individual soldier decisions, the soldiers have freedom to act, but may be held to account for their decisions in a court of law. The finder of fact must then balance the evidence. There is in the end a gain in that soldiers do not face a non-compliant enemy without recourse to options to compel the enemy to adhere to legal standards. American soldiers will not act in the absence of law since their actions are subject to investigation, examination and accounting in the criminal courts.
Proportionality endures as an element of reprisal in the proposed instruction.
Again, however, a court-martial has flexibility in assessing a proportionate response. As
Walzer noted, "the kind and amount of permissible…violence is that which is reasonably designed so to affect the enemy's expectations about the costs and gains of reiteration or continuation of his initial criminal act as to induce the termination of and future abstention from such act." 44 The 
